Michel Foucault’s initial writings on psychology, particularly his 1957 essay “Psychology from 1850 to 1950” and his 1965 dialogue “Philosophy and Psychology” with Alain Badiou, provide an intriguing insight into the evolution of his ideas. These texts not only critique psychology as a field but also set the foundation for concepts that would come to characterize Foucault’s intellectual journey. This article offers a brief exploration of these works, examining their subtleties and broader implications.

In his 1957 essay, Foucault meticulously traces the evolution of psychology over the past century. He begins with the discipline’s 19th-century roots, a time when psychology was enamored with natural sciences—some psychoanalysts refer to this as ‘physics envy’—aiming to solidify its status as a rigorous, empirical field. Foucault illustrates how early psychologists such as Fechner, Wundt, and Ribot endeavored to apply the methodologies of physics and chemistry to the study of mental processes. They aspired to uncover mental "elements" similar to chemical compounds, seeking to formulate laws of thought as precise as Newtonian physics.

Foucault argues that this quest for scientific validation was more than mere academic aspiration; it mirrored a larger cultural transformation in Western society’s understanding of human nature. The Enlightenment had displaced God as the ultimate arbiter of truth about humanity, creating a vacuum where science appeared to provide a new, secular basis for self-comprehension.

Nevertheless, Foucault points out that this positivist approach to psychology was inherently problematic from its inception. The complexities of the human mind could not be easily quantified or distilled into universal laws. As psychology strived to imitate the natural sciences, it increasingly confronted the intricate nature of human experience. Aspects like consciousness, emotion, and motivation proved to be far more elusive than physical atoms or chemical interactions.

Foucault’s critique is both delicate and profound. He does not merely dismiss early psychology as misguided; rather, he illustrates how the ambition to render psychology scientific led to significant insights regarding the limitations of scientific approaches when addressing human subjectivity. In attempting to fit the complexities of human experience into the rigid frameworks of positivist science, psychology was compelled to grapple with fundamental inquiries about the essence of mind and meaning.

As Foucault charts the evolution of psychology, he demonstrates how the field adapted to these challenges by embracing new paradigms. The emergence of evolutionary theory provided a fresh lens through which to view mental processes. Thinkers like Herbert Spencer and John Hughlings Jackson endeavored to frame mental activities as products of biological and social evolution, thus seemingly reconciling the intricacies of human psychology with the need for scientific explanation.

However, Foucault contends that while evolutionary psychology opened new avenues for exploration, it ultimately fell short of offering a holistic understanding of the human mind. It continued to depend on a fundamentally naturalistic perspective that could not fully incorporate the influence of culture, meaning, and subjectivity on psychological experiences.

A pivotal moment in Foucault’s discourse arises with the advent of Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis. In both his 1957 essay and the 1965 interview, Foucault highlights the transformative effect of Freud’s contributions. He asserts that psychoanalysis shifted the focus of psychology from causal explanations to the interpretation of meaning.

This change is monumental. Prior to Freud, psychology predominantly emphasized observable behaviors and quantifiable phenomena. Freud argued that the most significant aspects of mental life were hidden, unconscious, and accessible only through meticulous interpretation. Elements such as slips of the tongue, unusual dreams, and irrational fears transformed from mere curiosities into texts rich with hidden meaning.

Foucault expresses a clear fascination with this interpretive shift in psychology. In his 1965 interview, he draws parallels between psychoanalysis and literary criticism, suggesting that just as a critic analyzes a novel to unearth its deeper meanings, a psychoanalyst decodes the “text” of a patient's words and actions to uncover unconscious desires and conflicts.

Foucault extends this notion further, proposing that the unconscious possesses a "language-like structure" that does not adhere to traditional linguistic rules. He posits that the unconscious must communicate not only its messages but also the key to interpreting those messages. It’s as if each mind is a mystery novel where the detective and the perpetrator are one and the same, with clues embedded in the very narrative.

This emphasis on interpretation opened new realms of inquiry for psychology, yet it also prompted profound questions about the essence of psychological knowledge. If psychology focuses on deciphering meanings rather than uncovering facts, from where do those meanings originate? Foucault suggests, as articulated in both texts, that meanings arise from our history, culture, and social frameworks.

By the time of the 1965 interview, Foucault had evolved this idea into a radical reconfiguration of psychology itself, proposing that we view psychology not as a science but as a “cultural form”—a mode of thought, communication, and action deeply rooted in Western intellectual and social history. This assertion is provocative, removing psychology from the confines of the laboratory and placing it within the complex and chaotic realm of human culture.

Foucault goes even further, linking contemporary psychological practices to historical phenomena such as medieval confessionals and courtly love traditions. He argues that psychology, rather than being a neutral, objective science, represents the latest evolution of long-standing Western practices of self-reflection and self-transformation.

This reconceptualization of psychology as a cultural form enables Foucault to situate it within a broader critique of Western thought. He introduces the idea of an “anthropological slumber” that has, since Kant, oriented all philosophical inquiry (and by extension, the human sciences) around the notion of “man” as both the subject and object of knowledge. From this perspective, psychology does not merely study human nature; it actively engages in the cultural shaping of what it means to be human.

Foucault’s analysis is both historical and philosophical. He traces the genealogy of our contemporary understanding of “man,” illustrating how it emerged at a specific historical juncture and has shaped our self-perception ever since. In this light, psychology does not uncover timeless truths about human nature; instead, it articulates and reinforces a historically contingent way of being human.

This realization leads Foucault to one of his most provocative assertions: that psychological knowledge is inherently transformative. To understand in psychology is also to effect change. This concept links psychology inextricably to discussions of power and social control. If psychological knowledge influences subjectivity, then who possesses that knowledge and for what purposes becomes an essential inquiry.

Over the past century, psychology has forged new connections with various practical fields, including education, neurology, and organizational dynamics. It positioned itself as the rational and empirical foundation for these areas; developmental psychology became the framework for pedagogy, while psychopathology provided reflections on psychiatric practices.

This relationship was reciprocal, as psychology absorbed the challenges posed by these fields as its own inquiries: the concerns of academic success or failure, the complexities of reintegrating patients into society, and the necessity of adapting individuals to their roles. Through this close and continuous engagement with practice and the exchange of ideas, psychology appeared to align itself with natural sciences.

However, Foucault asserts that a crucial distinction exists. While natural sciences address problems arising from practical challenges and the provisional limitations of their experiences, psychology emerges at the intersection where human practices encounter their own contradictions. For example, developmental psychology arose from considerations of developmental impediments, while adaptation psychology emerged from analyzing maladjustment phenomena. The psychology of memory, consciousness, and sensation initially focused on forgetting, the unconscious, and emotional disorders.

This perspective leads Foucault to an intriguing conclusion: contemporary psychology fundamentally analyzes the abnormal, the pathological, and the conflictual, serving as a reflection on the contradictions inherent in human existence. It is only secondarily that it has evolved into a psychology of the normal, the adaptive, and the orderly, as if striving to master these contradictions.

This insight profoundly alters our understanding of psychology’s nature and role. It suggests that psychology is not merely a neutral, objective science examining the human mind, but a discipline that has emerged from and continues to contend with the tensions and contradictions inherent in human life. It positions psychology as a field closely tied to discussions of normativity, power, and social control.

Additionally, this viewpoint challenges the prevailing narrative of psychological advancement. Rather than perceiving psychology as gradually uncovering truths about human nature, Foucault encourages us to view it as a fluid cultural practice, perpetually redefined by societal needs and contradictions. This perspective raises critical inquiries about psychology’s role in shaping societal norms and individual subjectivities.

Here, we discern the early seeds of many ideas that would later preoccupy Foucault: the historical contingency of knowledge, the interplay of power and truth, and the processes through which individuals become subjects. These initial writings on psychology provide a glimpse of the thinker Foucault would become, already challenging the confines of traditional academic discourse.

Importantly, Foucault is not merely dismissing psychology or undermining its value. Instead, he advocates for a more reflective, critical approach to psychological knowledge. He prompts us to consider not only what psychology knows but also how it knows, and the effects of that knowledge on individuals and society.

Foucault’s critical lens on psychology remains strikingly relevant today. In an age dominated by cognitive neuroscience and big data analytics, his call to scrutinize fundamental assumptions about human nature and knowledge production is more important than ever. His emphasis on the cultural and historical dimensions of psychological knowledge serves as a valuable counterpoint to reductive or biologistic approaches, reminding us that the human psyche cannot be divorced from its social context.

Foucault’s early writings on psychology mark a pivotal moment in the philosophy of the human sciences, providing not only a critique of psychology but also a profound rethinking of human knowledge and existence. As we navigate questions of mind, behavior, and society in the 21st century, Foucault’s insights offer essential tools for critical reflection, challenging us to extend our thinking beyond established disciplines and consider the ethical and political ramifications of our self-understanding.

Ultimately, Foucault encourages us to perceive psychology not as an established science, but as a continuing cultural practice—a perpetual exploration of what it means to be human. In our fragmented and often alienating reality, this perspective provides a valuable framework for ongoing inquiry and self-examination.