The latest European Union elections took place on June 9, 2024, generating considerable anticipation. However, many had hoped for significant political upheaval that ultimately did not materialize.

Drawing from historical context, I find it unsurprising that such shifts didn't occur. As history shows, transformative changes are often driven not by debates and voting outcomes but by significant events that challenge the existing order, whether through warfare or the collapse of states, as seen with the Soviet Union's dissolution after 1989.

Despite the lack of dramatic shifts, the elections did reveal noteworthy political dynamics worth discussing, particularly in Romania and Hungary.

Focusing on Romania, the outcomes were largely expected. The far-right party, AUR, has gained traction since 2020, yet their anticipated breakthrough fell short, securing only 14.9% of the vote and five seats in the European Parliament. The fragmentation of the ultra-nationalist camp, exacerbated by the emergence of another party, SOS Romania, which garnered 5% of the vote, contributed to this outcome. Altogether, parties leaning towards the far-right captured around 20% of the total votes.

It's essential to note that Romania's mainstream parties generally adopt a more nationalistic stance than their Western European counterparts. A striking example occurred four years ago when President Klaus Iohannis unexpectedly greeted Hungarian political opponents in their language and accused them of conspiring to cede Transylvania to Hungary. Ironically, those he once accused are now his coalition partners.

In contrast, Hungary's political landscape has been far more tumultuous. Many view the country’s political system as an electoral autocracy rather than a genuine democracy. As of January, it appeared that Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Fidesz party would easily maintain its majority of 13 EU seats, possibly gaining even more. However, the situation took a turn.

Since February, the Fidesz party has faced numerous scandals, leading to the rise of a new competitor, Peter Magyar. A former lawyer and ex-husband of Orban's former justice minister, Magyar was once a loyal Fidesz supporter. He gained notoriety in February after an interview on an opposition YouTube channel went viral, reaching over 2 million viewers. His rally on March 15 attracted a larger crowd than Orban's.

Initially dismissed by Fidesz, Magyar's popularity soared, prompting the party to launch a smear campaign against him. This intensified when he leaked tapes implicating ministers in misconduct. Meanwhile, his former wife accused him of blackmailing her with these tapes. Despite the controversies, public sentiment largely dismissed her claims, with many mocking her on social media.

Magyar's rallies continued to draw significant crowds, culminating in his announcement to run in the EU elections as the vice president of the Respect and Freedom Party. On June 9, he secured nearly 30% of the vote, marking a significant challenge to Orban's Fidesz, which recorded its lowest ever EU election result at 44%, losing two seats compared to 2019. Other opposition parties fared poorly as well, with the liberal Momentum party's support plummeting from 9.9% to 3.7%, while a coalition that once exceeded 20% fell to just 8%.

In the broader context of Europe, Orban's remarks on March 15 suggested a desire for the European far-right to gain influence in Brussels. Over the past decade, many nationalist and EU-skeptic parties have shifted their stance from outright exit to reforming the EU from within, though they would require a substantial increase in representation to achieve this.

While the far-right's presence has grown since 2015, they still lack a majority. In 2019, pro-EU forces dominated the elections, yet the far-right did increase their share of the vote this time around. The European People's Party (EPP) remains the largest group in Parliament, gaining three seats for a total of 190, while the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost 12 seats, now holding 136. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) expanded their representation to 83 seats, a gain of 20, while the Renew group lost 17 seats, totaling 80.

Though the Identity and Democracy (ID) group decreased by 18 seats to 58, the Greens also saw a decline, winning 52 seats—15 fewer than in 2019. The Left group secured 39 seats, down by one. Additionally, 87 seats remain unassigned to any group.

The far-right ECR and ID together hold 143 seats, a slight increase from 2019, but this is partly due to the Afd's expulsion from the ID, which resulted in a loss of 15 seats. Including the unaligned parties, the far-right's total could rise significantly, encompassing parties like the Afd and Orban's Fidesz.

The total tally for far-right representation could reach 198 seats, about 27.5% of the EU Parliament. This marks a notable rise compared to 2014, when the far-right held just 16.7% of the seats. This growth is even more striking considering the absence of British representation, which previously provided substantial support to far-right parties.

Interestingly, there's speculation about whether the EPP is moving further right, as it includes parties that once openly accused coalition partners of treachery. Meanwhile, the Greens, Renew, and S&D have collectively lost over 44 seats, resulting in a significant reduction in their influence.

In conclusion, while far-right parties are indeed gaining traction in Europe, their ability to dominate EU institutions remains uncertain. They would need nearly double their current representation to achieve a majority. A more likely scenario involves these parties growing large enough to compel the EPP to form coalitions with them, a possibility that may arise in the next decade.

However, the far-right is not a monolithic bloc, as differences persist among member parties on issues like LGBTQ rights and foreign policy, particularly regarding Russia. The fractured nature of these alliances, coupled with deep historical grievances between countries, complicates the prospect of a united nationalist front. The recent expulsion of the Afd from the ID is just one example of these ongoing divisions.