Moving from facts to ethics

In a lecture at Cambridge University in 1929, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein prompted his students to envision a comprehensive book containing every truth known to humanity—an encyclopaedia of all factual statements.

Yet, Wittgenstein argued that this book would lack any ethical judgments or implications. He maintained that science can never produce moral conclusions. Mixing factual descriptions with ethical considerations, he believed, demands too much from our understanding of the world. For him, ethics transcends the natural realm, much like a teacup can only hold a teacup's worth of water, irrespective of how much is poured around it.

Wittgenstein's viewpoint can be regarded as conventional. He contended that while science is based on objective measurements, morality is a system of values that are not quantifiable but rather intuitively understood. Therefore, moral statements cannot be classified as true or false; they must remain somewhat ineffable. He likened moral truths to miracles—phenomena that defy logical explanation. The mystery of miracles fades once they are understood, just as moral truths may lose their significance when subjected to rigorous analysis.

The universality of moral law—its applicability at all times and in all contexts—sets it apart as a more refined truth, potentially divine in origin and an obligation that surpasses personal preferences.

Philosopher David Hume was among the first to explore the complex relationship between factual statements and moral laws. In his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), Hume questioned whether ethical values could logically arise from facts. He argued that one cannot derive what ought to be from what is, and he criticized thinkers who transition from "is" to "ought" without sufficient reasoning. He noted that this transition, while subtle, is crucially significant.

Consider a scenario where a charity fundraiser approaches you, sharing a dire situation in the world and suggesting that your donation could help. The implication of a moral obligation to give arises from the facts presented. We often overlook the logical gap: someone is suffering, thus we ought to help.

Is this not how we function as moral beings—by recognizing suffering and striving to alleviate it?

Well-being as a criterion for morality

Philosopher and neuroscientist Sam Harris posits that the link between facts and values is fundamentally uninteresting because values can be reduced to facts—specifically, facts regarding the well-being of conscious beings.

Harris invites us to imagine a world where every conscious entity endures maximum suffering for as long as possible. He identifies this scenario as the ultimate evil, with all other conditions being relatively better. This perspective suggests that our values stem from our understanding of well-being. Various scientific disciplines, from genetics to psychology, can provide valuable insights into the well-being of conscious creatures, and Harris argues that ignoring these insights reflects a lack of compassion.

It is evident that science can influence ethical considerations. Since Hume's era, the impact of science on our lives has intensified, prompting 21st-century thinkers to seek certainty in an increasingly secular context. Theoretical physicist Lawrence Krauss asserts that we cannot discern right from wrong without scientific knowledge, as it provides the foundational understanding upon which our values are built.

Consider the scientific study of animal cognition. As we learn more about how animals think and feel, our definitions of animal cruelty must evolve. If science were to demonstrate that a fish experiences pain similarly to humans, our treatment of such creatures would undoubtedly change.

Likewise, as scientific research uncovers the effects of environment and upbringing on child development, our societal norms regarding parenting will adapt accordingly.

A direct link between science and human behavior can be found in public health. Guidelines regarding alcohol, tobacco, dietary fats, and more are derived from scientific inquiry. Once scientific findings become established, our perceptions of appropriate behavior are often adjusted.

However, do scientific findings genuinely lead the conversation, or is there a deeper moral force simply adapting to our evolving understanding? In what ways can scientific progress be said to inform moral principles?

Consequentialist morality

When discussing morality, we often focus on the consequences of actions. For instance, if theft is deemed wrong, it is typically framed in terms of the harm inflicted on the victim.

This line of reasoning aligns with consequentialism, which posits that a morally correct action is one that yields beneficial outcomes. This approach suggests a guiding principle: individuals should act in ways that maximize positive consequences, providing a practical framework for moral behavior.

A well-known thought experiment that explores consequentialism involves a runaway trolley. In this scenario, you witness an uncontrolled trolley heading toward a group of workers. You can pull a lever to divert the trolley onto another track, where one person stands unsuspectingly. Do you act to save the five workers at the expense of one life, or do you refrain from intervening?

This dilemma reveals the competing considerations we face in moral decision-making and highlights the role of emotion and context in ethical reasoning. The exercise of imagining increasingly complex scenarios underscores that our moral beliefs are frequently under-examined and can be easily challenged by hypothetical situations.

Moreover, this thought experiment complicates the consequentialist perspective, as a strict consequentialist would likely justify pulling the lever. This raises a crucial question: what does "good" mean, and whose perspective determines it?

The concept of "good" is contentious, as evidenced by the polarized debate surrounding abortion. The "pro-choice" camp argues for a woman's autonomy over her body, while the "pro-life" camp emphasizes the rights of the embryo or fetus.

Science contributes to this discourse in two significant ways: it enhances our understanding of embryonic development and offers insights into the survival of prematurely born infants. The determination of when a fertilized egg becomes a "person" and thus entitled to the same rights as born individuals is increasingly ambiguous. Is it at fertilization or when the fetus exhibits awareness, such as the ability to feel pain? The debate continues largely because the definition of "personhood" remains elusive, intertwined with cultural and linguistic factors that differ across societies.

In a globalized context, where diverse cultures intersect, moral disagreements are more pronounced than ever. Should objective science hold a privileged position in these discussions?

Looking at animals

Philosopher Peter Singer has long examined the origins of ethics through the lens of human evolution, drawing insights from the animal kingdom, such as the basic ethical behaviors observed in non-human primates. However, he argues that while science can elucidate the roots of morality—suggesting it evolved among social animals as a reciprocal act—the trajectory of evolution does not always align with moral principles.

Humans possess language, allowing us to engage with morality in ways that no other species can. While we have come to recognize the inherent value of all human life, evolutionary tendencies often lead us to prioritize kin over distant strangers. This intellectual awareness serves as a corrective to our instinctual inclinations.

Singer emphasizes that while scientific discoveries inform our understanding of the world, we still rely on our moral sensibilities to assess the implications of that knowledge.

Lingering problems

This brings us to the fundamental issue with the science-based morality proposed by Harris and other consequentialists. By asserting that species well-being is a value to be pursued, they inadvertently presuppose the validity of the concepts of "good" and "ought," which remain to be substantiated. They fall prey to Hume's fallacy.

Ultimately, it may be said that while science should and does inform our values, it lacks the authority to prioritize them. If ethics encompasses two essential questions—what is ultimately good, and how do we maximize those goods—science can only assist in addressing the latter. The former remains shrouded in mystery.

Christopher P. Jones is the author of What Great Artworks Say, which delves into some of art’s most captivating images.